

## **The Role of the United Nations in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform (SSR)**

Report from the Roundtable co-organised by Slovakia and the Netherlands with the assistance of DCAF

New York, 3 November 2006

Security sector reform (SSR) is a concept that has acquired increasing acceptance in the international community, with intergovernmental organisations assuming an important role in shaping the SSR agenda and supporting SSR programmes. For many years now, the United Nations system has also been engaged in a wide range of SSR activities, although not necessarily under the label of SSR. What has been absent to date is a common, comprehensive and coordinated UN approach to SSR. There is, however, increasing interest within the UN system and strong calls from the field for such an approach, which would serve as a valuable orientation and planning tool for various UN institutions working on SSR and in related areas. It is against this backdrop that Slovakia, in its capacity as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 2006-2007, initiated a debate on the UN's role in SSR with a view to holding an open meeting of the UNSC on this topic in the course of Slovakia's Presidency in February 2007. In this context, a Roundtable co-chaired by Slovakia and the Netherlands was held on 3 November 2006 at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in New York to discuss the UN's role in supporting SSR in post-conflict settings. The Roundtable – the first in a series – provided an occasion to compare and contrast the approach taken by the international community and especially the role of the various UN institutions in three very different post-conflict environments: Haiti, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste.

This report provides a summary of the key points of the presentations and discussions at the Roundtable.

### **Presentations and Discussions**

The Roundtable, moderated by Professor Heiner Hänggi, Assistant Director and Head of Research at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), was opened by Ambassador Roman Bužek, Director-General for International Organizations & ODA of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, and Ambassador Wim Geerts, Deputy Director-General for Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. Ambassador Bužek provided an introduction of the Slovak initiative, and talked of it as an open-ended process which should not finish with the Slovak Presidency of the UNSC (see annex). Mr. Geerts then examined the concept of SSR, and in particular the fact that it constitutes a long-term process which involves various actors and different contexts (see annex). The keynote statement was delivered by Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, UN Under-Secretary-

General for Peacekeeping Operations, who emphasised the growing importance of SSR, as well as the importance of approaching security in a holistic way and recognizing that sustainable security involves institutions and process, management and oversight of the security sector. Mr. Guéhenno suggested that the UN could play a role in SSR by supporting national governments in defining their security needs in a holistic way; by coordinating the delivery of assistance across a range of different activities; and by improving capacity to support the management and oversight of security institutions (see annex).

The opening session was followed by a session dedicated to comparing the different contexts of SSR in Sierra Leone, Haiti, and Timor-Leste. Mr. José Luis Guterres, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, painted a compelling picture of the challenges facing SSR in East Timor, and underlined the importance of taking stock of the lessons learned in the country. In this respect, he emphasised the need for national ownership not only when things go right, but also when things go wrong. He stressed the importance of working simultaneously on the security sector as well as the justice sector. Mr. Eucher-Luc Joseph, State Secretary for Public Security of Haiti, and Mr. Richard Warren, Deputy Police Commissioner of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), discussed the challenges of SSR in Haiti. Mr. Joseph examined the specificity of the Haitian context, linked to the absence of war, a fragile political system, corruption, and lack of leadership. He also underlined the extreme importance of rule of law and justice which are considered as necessary conditions for achieving durable results in SSR (see annex). Mr. Warren provided a key insight into MINUSTAH, as well as a detailed evaluation of the Haitian Reform Plan (see annex). Finally, Mr. Mark White, Deputy Programme Manager at the UK Department for International Development (DfID), addressed the context of SSR in Sierra Leone, offered some compelling lessons learned, and identified the challenges of the way ahead. One of the key elements in his statement was also the relationship between SSR and justice reform (see annex). This session was wrapped up by Mr. Anis A. Bajwa, Director of Change Management, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Mr. Bajwa emphasised the fact that SSR does not lend itself well to a single model or template, but rather the importance of linking separate models to different contexts.

An important aspect of the Roundtable was the break-out sessions whereby the participants were divided into three groups. Ms. Carolyn McAskie, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, chaired the discussions on whether the UN did have an overall strategy for SSR implementation in the countries in question, which concluded that, while such a strategy may have been lacking in the past, the UN is slowly moving in this direction; Mr. Christopher Coleman, Chief, Policy Planning and Mediation Support, UN Department of Political Affairs, chaired the session on the issue of local ownership, at which the importance of early assessment and engagement with local actors was underlined; and, Mr. Mark Downes from the OECD DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Coordination (CPDC), chaired the session on UN coordination with the donor community, and it was agreed that a difference had to be made between operational level coordination – which exists – as opposed to strategic or political-level coordination which may be lacking.

The Roundtable was concluded by Ambassador Geerts, who emphasised that whilst there seemed to be agreement on the broad definition of SSR, the holistic approach

needed and the inextricable link between SSR and justice, all UN actors have their own role to play in this process. More discussion and expertise is needed to get a better understanding of what the UN's role could and indeed should be in post-conflict SSR. Mr. Geerts also stated that this discussion should take the work previously carried out, e.g. by the OECD, as its starting point. Ambassador Bužek announced that the second Roundtable will be held on 8 December 2006 in New York, where discussions will focus on the way in which regional approaches to SSR may provide the information necessary to the development of a UN SSR concept.

### **Challenges of Post-Conflict SSR**

From the presentations and discussions that took place at this Roundtable, it is possible to decipher the main challenges pertaining to the issue of the UNs role in post-conflict SSR. Apart from the relationship between SSR and justice sector reform, these include the need for a holistic approach; coordination among multiple actors; sustainability; local ownership; and mainstreaming gender and human rights concerns, and most importantly of all,.

***Holistic Approach.*** A particular challenge of post-conflict SSR is to address SSR in a holistic way by simultaneously engaging armed non-state actors *and* building the governmental capacity to provide security to the people in an accountable way; building capacity of security and justice institutions *and* promoting appropriate management and oversight mechanisms; constructing or reconstructing (rather than reforming) the security sector *and* tackling SSR-related issues such as DDR and transitional justice. In this respect, the emphasis was put on the need to steer away from a piecemeal approach to SSR as this can, for example, lead to the problems encountered in Haiti or East Timor. Indeed, it is not possible to build up a particular institution or group without taking into account its inter-relatedness with other security and justice providers.

***Coordination.*** The need to take into account the different areas of SSR contributes to the problem of coordination. The human resource intensive aspect of SSR also accounts for the reason why effective coordination constitutes a fundamental aspect of any successful SSR process. Coordination should be understood as not just bringing together entities within the UN system, but coordination among all relevant international actors involved in post-conflict SSR assistance, which is clearly vital but often remains poor in practice, whether because different mandates cover SSR only partially or because actors are reluctant to coordinate. Regional, subregional and other intergovernmental organisations such as AU, ECOWAS, EU, OSCE and NATO have been increasingly active in the SSR field as well; some of them have started working on their own guidelines and developing implementation policies. In this respect, the OECD DAC's recently developed implementation framework for SSR (IF SSR) was recognised as providing a first step towards a common understanding of SSR and consequently should reflect positively on matters of coordination and guiding principles.

***Sustainability.*** Another key feature of SSR is the need to achieve a sustainable SSR process, which is linked to the security-development nexus, and in particular the need to ensure that the socio-economic aspects are factored in. There is a need for planning

right from the outset (before peacekeepers are deployed), and this planning should address political, economic, and social aspects, as well as rule of law, good governance, etc. In this respect, SSR should be considered as encompassing the stabilisation, recovery and sustainable development of a country. Sustainability is thus linked to the concept of affordability – as SSR is an expensive process that requires the attribution of sufficient resources – as well as to the concept of local ownership (see below).

**Local Ownership.** The importance of ensuring local ownership was underlined during the Roundtable, although it was acknowledged that not all situations are conducive to making local ownership the point of departure; in some post-conflict environments it may not be possible, or it may even be counterproductive, for local elites to assume early ownership of the SSR process. An important step to local ownership was considered to be the dissemination of information which is crucial for local buy-in and can help to close the information gap which may exist with the grassroots. In this context, when considering the importance of coordination (see above), emphasis should be placed on the role of national rather than international actors to take on a coordination role whenever possible.

**Human Rights, Humanitarian and Gender Concerns.** The importance of funnelling human rights, humanitarian and gender concerns into the SSR process was recognised as being of particular importance in ‘securitized’ post-conflict environments. The issue of children in armed conflict (recruitment and use of child soldiers and other similar problems) is often closely related, too.

### **Towards an UN Approach to SSR**

There was general consensus among the participants that it is time for the UN to address the manifest lack of a UN strategy or a comprehensive approach to post-conflict SSR. The following are key issues to be addressed when reflecting upon the possible UN approach(es) to SSR.

**Guidelines.** It was generally agreed that there is no need to reinvent the wheel, but rather to see how the wheel might fit the UN. In this respect, the OECD DAC IF SSR was perceived as an important tool for the future. Nonetheless, it was recognised that the IF SSR essentially remains a donor’s instrument, and that the UN as the only universal organisation with the necessary credibility, will need to consider the special role it has to play by virtue of its operational experience, global outlook and resulting legitimacy, as well as the many specific challenges it faces in terms of mandates, capacities, funding and interagency coordination. In this respect, the role of the UNSC was considered important, as through its mission mandates it sets the parameters for post-conflict SSR. In relation to the recognised importance of developing system-wide UN SSR principles and guidelines, which can be tailored to specific country and regional contexts, particularly post-conflict contexts, there was a general consensus that instead of just one model being applied, the real need is for templates. Possible suggestions raised were a set of UN specific guidelines to complement the IF SSR, a UN framework for approaching SSR, or a set of principles to guide UN involvement in SSR.

**Strategy.** There is a need to elaborate on the SSR strategy that the UN should pursue and reflect in the relevant guidelines. In particular, there were calls for a need to adopt a transition strategy from peacekeeping to longer-term development as opposed to an exit strategy. Another element discussed was the importance of planning for SSR right from the starting point and for its inclusion within the peacemaking process. Moreover, in the elaboration of a UN SSR strategy, it will be important to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the UN, and of its funds and agencies, and to reflect on its comparative advantages in SSR.

**Coordination.** There is a pressing need to decide how to coordinate the UN's approach to SSR. Possible suggestions for improving coordination were to assign focal points across the UN system, or to design a SSR cluster leader so that a particular institution takes responsibility for coordinating the UN's support to SSR. Participants raised the question of whether an existing mechanism is already in place, or whether a new one would need to be created.

**Resources.** SSR was recognised as being a long-term process that is integral to peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. Moreover, SSR falls into a 'grey zone' between traditional peacekeeping and development concerns, thus meaning that the need to assure long-term commitment in terms of both human and financial resources is essential. The necessity of reflecting on the possible manners in which the span of attention of the international community and donors can be expanded was recognised. The role that the newly created Peacebuilding Commission – and the Peacebuilding Fund in particular – could potentially play in this also requires further examination.

**Regional Dimension.** It was accepted that it is not possible to understand the dynamics of SSR without taking into account regional considerations as is clearly illustrated, for example, by developments in the Western Balkans and in West Africa. Regional cooperative approaches have a tendency to create a more conducive environment for the implementation of SSR, while regional conflicts tend to weaken them. Looking into specific regional approaches to SSR and exploring options for closer interaction between the UN and regional, subregional and other intergovernmental organisations in promoting SSR may be a useful second step in deepening the discussion on specific aspects of SSR in the UN context.

## **Annex:** Programme and Presentations

## **“United Nations’ Role in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform”**

Roundtable co-chaired by Slovakia and the Netherlands

New York, 3 November 2006

Date: 3 November 2006

Venue: Crowne Plaza Hotel at the United Nations, 304 East 42<sup>nd</sup> Street, New York, NY 10017

Moderator: **Prof. Heiner Hänggi** (DCAF)

### **09:00-09:30 OPENING SESSION**

**09:00-09:15** *Welcome statements by **Mr. Roman Bužek**, Director-General for International Organizations & ODA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia and **Mr. Wim Geerts**, Deputy Director General for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands*

**09:15-09:30** *Keynote statement by **H.E. Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno**, United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations*

### **09:30-12:30 COMPARING CONTEXT – SIERRA LEONE, HAITI, TIMOR-LESTE**

**09:30-09:50** *Statement on Timor-Leste by **H.E. Mr. José Luis Guterres**, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste*

**09:50-10:10** *Statement on Haiti by **Mr. Richard Warren**, MINUSTAH Deputy Police Commissioner and **Mr. Eucher-Luc Joseph**, Secrétaire d’Etat à la sécurité publique, Haiti*

**10:10-10:30** *Statement on Sierra Leone by **Mr. Mark White**, Department for International Development, UK*

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**10:30-10:45** *Coffee break*

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**10:45-11:05** *Wrap-up statement by **Mr. Anis A. Bajwa**, Director of Change Management, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

**11:05-12:20** *Discussion*

## **12:30-13:45 BREAK-OUT SESSIONS**

Participants divided into three groups will address the following questions over lunch:

- How did the UN and its agencies approach the issue of local ownership? Was effective local ownership secured through the project?
- Did the UN have an overall strategy for SSR implementation in the countries in question? What kinds of structures were put in place for co-ordinating the work of different UN agencies? Where were the strong and weak points? What was the role of the UNSC mandate in shaping this strategy?
- What kinds of structures were put in place for co-ordinating the work of the UN and the donor community?

**Chairs:** *Ms. Carolyn McAskie, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support*  
*Mr. Christopher Coleman, Chief, Policy Planning and Mediation Support, UN Department of Political Affairs*  
*Mr. Mark Downes, OECD, DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC), Policy Co-ordination Division, Development Co-operation Directorate*

## **13:50-15:00 CLOSING PLENARY**

**13:50-14:20** *Reports from break-out sessions* by respective chairpersons

**14:20-15:00** *Conclusions* with a view to developing elements for the UN SSR concept by Slovakia and the Netherlands

## **Introductory Statement**

by

**Mr. Roman Bužek,**

*Director-General for International Organizations & ODA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of  
Slovakia*

*Roundtable:*

### **“United Nations’ Role in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform”**

*(New York, 3 November 2006)*

Ladies and Gentlemen, Excellencies, Dear Friends,

Let me first of all welcome you all and thank you for responding to our invitation in such numbers. One of our main reasons for initiating a UN debate on SSR has been to raise the awareness about this important issue in the wider UN community. We hope your presence here today is a good signal that we are moving in a good direction.

Let me also thank our Dutch colleagues for their invaluable help and co-operation in organising this roundtable.

My special thanks go to our colleagues from the Geneva DCAF, especially to Ambassador Winkler who unfortunately could not join us today, and to Professor Hanggi and his colleagues who made a tremendous job in arranging this meeting.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Our decision to actively promote a debate on SSR in the capacity of the non-permanent member of the UN Security Council resulted initially from our own transformation experience. Slovakia has just recently gone through a deep and wide transformation process that touched upon almost every sphere of the life of our country and the security sector reform was an important element of this process.

We were further encouraged to focus on SSR by recognizing a limited ability of the UN Security Council and other UN bodies to facilitate more effectively and efficiently a sustainable post-conflict reconstruction.

At the same time, we saw a growing need to address SSR within the UN as a key factor for stabilizing post-conflict regions and assisting them to embark on a sustainable development trajectory. Our ten-month experience in the UN Security Council has only deepened our conviction that a successful SSR is crucial for:

Avoiding a relapse to the conflict and thus ensuring long-term and sustainable stability and security through promoting governments’ ability to rebuild effective integrated national security forces;

Improvement of human rights situation through the application of the rule of law, civil control and accountability in the security forces;

Creating opportunities for economic development, since you can hardly expect any investments in an unstable environment;

Last but not least, exit strategy of the UN.

We are glad to see that there is a growing understanding in the international community about the significance of SSR for efforts to build up a democratic society and sustainable peace after a conflict has ended. However, the level of this understanding often differs, efforts made in the field of SSR are usually only partial or limited and the co-operation between individual stakeholders is insufficient or lacking.



In this context, the demand for a holistic and more comprehensive approach to SSR is growing. The UN Security Council acknowledged in the Presidential Statement adopted on 12 July 2005 that the security sector reform is an essential element of any stabilisation process in post-conflict environments, underlined that it was inextricably linked with promotion of the rule of law, transitional justice, DDR and the protection of civilians, among others, and acknowledged the need for a more adequate preparation, including mobilisation of necessary planning resources and more coherent approaches by the United Nations and the international community in addressing these issues.

The call for a more holistic, comprehensive and co-ordinated approach is clear from this statement and these are also the ideas on which our initiative is built. Reflecting our own experience and this growing demand led Slovakia to the decision to promote and facilitate a discussion on the SSR in the context of our membership in the Security Council. In June this year, Slovakia organised a workshop on *Developing a Security Sector Reform Concept for the United Nations* in Bratislava. (You have all received the brochure from that seminar in your roundtable package this morning.) Now, we have moved our focus to New York our today's meeting is the first one in a series of activities we are planning to undertake in the upcoming months. Today, we are going to look at UN experience in promoting security sector reform in various post-conflict situations. In about one-month time – on 8 December - we are planning to organise the second roundtable that will focus on the co-operation of the UN with regional, sub-regional and other international organisations. Thirdly, we would like to organise a roundtable that would study in bigger detail one particular case.

Our activities here in New York should culminate in February 2007, during our Presidency in the Security Council. We would like to organise a thematic debate on security sector reform in the Security Council. It should be preceded by an Arrria-formula meeting with relevant NGOs.

Still, we perceive our initiative as an open-ended process that should not end with our Presidency or even membership in the Security Council. Next year we would also like to move our activities to the continent where SSR is most urgent – we would like to organise a seminar in Africa in order to discuss the specific problems of the African countries in this field and in order to sensitise the population of Africa to the importance of this issue.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Looking at the impressive list of speakers and participants I have no doubts that we are going to have an inspiring and stimulating debate on the crucial topic of SSR. We are very much looking forward to today's and the following discussions that we are planning to organise in New York. I can assure you that all the ideas presented will not be lost, since the main goal of our activities is to stimulate a transparent and inclusive debate of the security sector reform. I can assure you that the final outcome of the Security Council thematic debate will heavily rely and to a large extent build on opinions presented today and in the upcoming months. I therefore thank you in advance for your constructive co-operation and inputs to this important discussion.



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**STATEMENT BY**

**THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS,  
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE NETHERLANDS**

**MR. WIM GEERTS**

**UNITED NATIONS' ROLE IN POST-CONFLICT  
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM**

**SECURITY SECTOR REFORM-SEMINAR**

**NEW YORK, 3 NOVEMBER 2006**

Mr. Under-Secretary-General,  
Excellencies,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

Let me start by complimenting Slovakia on taking the initiative to organise this series of seminars and for putting the important subject of Security Sector Reform and its challenges for the UN on the agenda. It is good to see so many of you. The Netherlands recognizes the role which Security System Reform plays in the process of emerging from conflict. Security of people (and not only security of states) is a precondition for development and development contributes to lasting peace and security. No development without security and no security without development. In my opening statement I would like to focus on three issues: SSR is a **long term process** in which many **different actors** have to work closely and coherently together in **different contexts**.

A country that emerges from armed conflict often faces multiple problems; a social fabric torn apart; a poor humanitarian situation; a collapsed economy; weakened public administration; high unemployment; displaced and/or traumatised people; and the profusion of small arms and high crime rate, creating feelings of insecurity. Experience has shown that, in 30% of post-conflict countries, violence flares up again within ten years. In Africa, the figure is as high as 50%. Only an accountable, effective and efficient security system operating under civilian control within a democratic context and respecting human rights can be a force for peace and stability. And hence for development.

Security Sector Reform has many facets and involves many actors, including the police, defence and intelligence services, customs and border control, prisons, and criminal justice. Many different international organisations and donors have been active in those fields for years. But now we need to look at the linkages between these fields— for example the triangle of police, justice and the penal system – because that's what makes security work. Consequently, we need to link projects and activities in these areas, and put them in a context. SSR is not only about training or building courts but also about developing the governance structures: we do not want to train the people on the ground without ensuring that there is an effective, civilian control system in place. SSR deals with issues of power and control, and that is why a holistic, integrated approach is necessary.

An integrated approach is a challenge not only for countries emerging from conflict, or donor countries like ourselves; it is also a challenge for international organisations like the United Nations. Today's initiative has therefore come at the right time. We will be discussing the UN's role in post-conflict SSR. But who is the UN in this case? The UN consists of many different agencies and bodies, such as DPA, DPKO, UNDP, UNIFEM, and UNICEF. Each with its own capacity, mandate and field of expertise. All of them have their own important role to play in the process of SSR. However, overlap and gaps should be avoided.

Key to this integrated approach is building a common understanding of SSR, dealing with the different roles UN agencies and bodies play in the field of both crisis management/peacekeeping and development operations. The real challenge for the UN is to develop a corporate strategy for SSR that can mould input from across the organisation according to the specific country context, ranging from post-conflict countries to countries in transition. We could discuss the idea today that in order to ensure an effective UN approach, the different bodies and agencies might appoint designated SSR advisors .

During the discussion today, it's important to keep in mind that SSR is not a short-term, technical process carried out in isolation. Rather, it is a long term political process that requires a developmental approach. Post-conflict situations and hence the development of a stable and secure environment usually last longer than peacekeeping forces are present. However, the foundation for a good SSR process is laid during the immediate post-conflict phase. This implies that UN bodies and agencies like DPA, DPKO and UNDP should be very much aware of the paramount importance of SSR within the context of peace agreements and peacekeeping missions and how these will affect future peace building activities. SSR should be viewed as an integral part of peace agreements and hence the need for a planning process for immediate post-conflict situations and peace building operations, with a forward looking mind.

Let me wrap up by quoting a remark made by my Slovak counterpart at the seminar in Bratislava earlier this year: (quote) "there is a growing consensus that we could and should reach a common understanding on a single system-wide approach on SSR within the UN and among all interested players" (unquote). I fully agree with him. This is where the key challenge lies: to establish consensus and build on what has already been achieved in this area.

In this regard, the OECD/DAC's guidelines on SSR and Governance and the newly developed 'Implementation Framework for SSR' provide international reference points which I believe can make a useful contribution to the efforts of the UN and the wider community in the area of SSR.

Let's not reinvent the wheel, but see how the wheel can fit the UN.

Thank you.

USG Jean-Marie Guéhenno

Talking Points for the Roundtable co-chaired by Slovakia and the Netherlands  
'United Nations' Role in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform'

- It's a great pleasure to join so many colleagues – and experts – this morning. Let me say, from the outset, how grateful my Department, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, is to the Governments of Slovakia and the Netherlands for taking the initiative to organize today's event.
- I've been impressed by the comprehensive, and considered way in which the Permanent Representations of Slovakia and the Netherlands have prepared today's meeting. In that regard, I should also note our appreciation to DCAF for its role.
- The theme of the roundtable is not only timely it is a vital one for the entire enterprise of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
- We can't begin any discussion of security sector reform in post-conflict contexts without underscoring how far we have collectively come in our understanding of the challenges involved in moving from conflict to sustainable peace.
- In the UN we have had to confront the reality that security is a crucial precondition to sustainable peacebuilding. Unless we establish a basic degree of security and order for the state and the communities within it, little progress can be made in initiating longer-term development processes. Assisting in the provision of that security is the core function of UN peacekeeping operations.
- But we've also come to recognize that security is only one part of the peacebuilding process. In helping states and societies address the immediate consequences of conflict, and tackle, at the same time, the longer-term underlying causes of conflict, there are a whole range of tasks involved. These range from support to public administration, reform of the rule of law institutions and local governance.
- In the past, we tended to see these tasks as separate activities that took place in different phases of the peace process. Today, we have a much greater awareness of how interconnected these tasks are. And we have to plan for them from the very outset of a post-conflict peace process, and not only as part of an exit strategy.
- The whole concept of security sector reform reflects this evolution in our collective thinking. For me, the essence of SSR is two-fold:



- First is the idea that we can't address the protection of the state, and the communities within it, in a piecemeal way. We can't build up one particular institution or group, without thinking how it inter-relates to other providers of security, state and non-state, formal or informal. The case of Timor-Leste, which you will discuss today with Minister Guterres, is the most recent example of the dangers of a piecemeal approach to security.
- But approaching security in a holistic way does not only refer to the breadth of institutions and actors to be addressed. It also refers to an understanding of what 'security' means to the men, women and children that will benefit from it. A holistic security approach is a context and community-relevant approach. Sierra Leone offers good examples of how communities can be brought into SSR, and I hope we will discuss this further today.
- What this holistic approach also means is that there will be many players involved – on the supply side and on the demand side. And that makes early needs assessment, priority setting and coordination crucial for SSR. The UN, I believe, has a potential useful role to play in these areas.
- The second essential element behind SSR is the recognition that sustainable security involves institutions and process, management and oversight. For too long we focused on individuals in the provision of security – their training, their equipment – without addressing the institutions behind them.
- We are much more conscious of that today in DPKO – particularly in law enforcement, the area in which we have strongest capacity. It's for that reason that we have set up, with Member State support, the Standing Police Capacity, which is intended to increase our capacity to support the building of law enforcement institutions as well as police personnel.
- But it goes beyond institutional set up. It extends to sound management practices and sustainable budgetary support and administration. Without these elements, security isn't sustainable in the medium to long term – as we've learned, to our cost in Haiti in the past.
- So that's the easy bit of SSR, defining the need. We're all agreed on that. Where things get more complex is in working out how we collectively respond to that need.
- Here, we have a range of challenges. The first challenge is finding the balance between a holistic approach and the need to respect the very different roles, functions and relationships between the different actors involved in SSR – the military, law enforcement institutions and the judicial elements. We need a holistic strategy and approach, but the programmatic delivery must be designed and delivered for the specific actors.

- This reality reinforces the significance of a coordinating capacity in SSR. Equally, it suggests the need to approach carefully the creation of 'SSR support structures' – they must contribute to, not confuse, strategies and operational activities.
- The second challenge is in finding the balance between capacity and governance. In post-conflict contexts, devastation is often horrendous. SSR in these contexts has to begin by DDR – deconstructing wartime security arrangements – and then begin a whole process of reconstructing, sometimes from scratch, security institutions and processes. At the same time, governance isn't an afterthought at the end of a reconstruction process – it has to be part of the rebuilding strategy from the very start.
- The rebuilding and reform of armed forces is the area in which the international community has encountered most difficulties. UN peacekeeping operations do not have the mandate, the resources or the capacity to undertake the rebuilding of militaries.
- For many Member States, support to such activity is difficult. There is the capacity issue, but there is also the funding, which cannot be easily subsumed under current ODA criteria.
- There are some countries that are prepared to provide the required support through bilateral arrangements and to take on the lead responsibility, such as the UK in Sierra Leone or the United States in Liberia. But in those countries that do not have a lead actor, or which are too big for any one country to address, the alternative to sustainable security is not a protracted UN peacekeeping operation.
- Where the UN can play a role is in supporting national governments define their security needs in a holistic way; in coordinating the delivery of assistance across a range of different activities; and in improving capacity to support the management and oversight of security institutions.
- To achieve all this requires all UN partners to engage in a consistent, coordinated effort. And we have begun this process.
- But SSR is not a job for the UN alone – even a perfectly coordinated and effective one. We need the engagement of Member States, of regional organizations, of International financial institutions and NGOs with technical expertise. I look forward to exploring with you, under the able leadership of our co-hosts today, and in future meetings, how we can organize, resource and implement this collective approach.
- Many thanks



**Intervention du Secrétaire d'Etat a la Sécurité Publique, Me  
Eucher-Luc Joseph, a la Table Ronde portant sur le rôle des  
Nations dans la Reforme du Secteur de Sécurité Publique dans  
un environnement post-conflit (3 Novembre 2006- Crown  
Plaza, New-York)**

**La réforme du secteur de la sécurité publique en Haïti :  
Enjeux et priorités**

Je voudrais, tout d'abord remercier les organisateurs pour cette importante rencontre et de l'opportunité qu'ils m'ont offerte de partager avec eux la position et les initiatives du gouvernement, auquel j'ai l'honneur d'appartenir, dans le cadre du processus de réforme du Secteur de la Sécurité Publique.

Mon intervention s'articule autour de trois axes :

I- Les Antécédents

II- La Reforme de la Sécurité a l'épreuve des problèmes de fond de la crise haïtienne

III- les priorités relatives a la Reforme

**I- Antécédents**

- 1- Au début de l'année 1986, la crise politique ouverte à la fin des années 70 dans le pays connaît une brutale accélération. La dictature des Duvalier vieille de trente années est renversée. La transition politique qui est initiée présente deux caractéristiques majeures : une forte expression des revendications relatives aux droits à la sécurité et à la justice et l'influence prononcée des facteurs externes.

- 2- Il s'ensuit une période marquée par l'échec des différentes tentatives d'issue à la transition. Les régimes militaires qui se sont succédé au pouvoir jusqu'en 1990 ont eu pour effet d'affaiblir considérablement l'armée en tant que pilier du système politique haïtien. Le Coup d'Etat des 29/30 septembre 1991 a précipité la décomposition de la seule institution de sécurité existante (les Forces Armées d'Haïti, FADH). Cette dernière est finalement démobilisée par le Président Jean Bertrand Aristide.
- 3- La crise née du Coup d'Etat a aussi contribué à affaiblir les capacités nationales de réponse aux grands problèmes nationaux dont particulièrement ceux de la sécurité et de la justice. Dans le même temps, la présence de la communauté internationale en Haïti acquiert un caractère quasi permanent. Le pays a ainsi expérimenté, d'une part, des efforts internationaux de négociation entre acteurs politiques haïtiens pour rétablir la paix (peace-making) principalement à travers l'OEA ; d'autre part, l'action internationale pour imposer la paix (peace-enforcement) avec le recours à la force (résolution 940 du Conseil de Sécurité – 1994) ; enfin, l'action pour assurer sur le terrain le maintien de la paix (peace-keeping).
- 4- Le mandat de la MIPONUH (Mission de la police civile des Nations Unies en Haïti) – sixième mission précédant la MINUSTAH - a expiré le 30 novembre 1998. Quelques années après, la crise politique rebondit entraînant une aggravation des problèmes de sécurité et de justice dans le pays. La nouvelle mission des Nations Unies (MINUSTAH) déployée sur le terrain doit chercher à éviter les erreurs passées et travailler avec le Gouvernement en vue de résoudre les problèmes de fond en matière de sécurité et de justice.

## **II- La réforme de la sécurité publique à l'épreuve des problèmes de fond de la crise haïtienne**

- 5- L'impératif qui s'impose de toute urgence dans le pays à l'heure actuelle est celui de la reconstruction ou de la remise sur pied pratiquement de l'ensemble des institutions de l'Etat (police, justice, administration publique...). L'autre problème de fond de la crise haïtienne est celui de la marginalisation et de la pauvreté de masse. Ce qui contribue à aggraver la situation de violence.
- 6- L'impunité structurelle dont souffre le pays représente aussi un défi majeur. Elle facilite les agissements des secteurs mafieux et criminels. Les trafics en tous genres prolifèrent (trafic d'armes, de la drogue). Certaines estimations fixent à 200.000 armes de tous calibres en circulation dans le pays.
- 7- La seule force de sécurité dont dispose le pays, la Police Nationale d'Haïti, n'a pas à l'heure actuelle la capacité suffisante pour maintenir l'ordre public dans les villes. Et la majorité des sections communales où vit la majorité de la population est dépourvue de présence policière. Cet élément fait donc clairement ressortir la spécificité de la situation haïtienne. Le pays est loin de connaître les conséquences induites par des guerres ou des conflits violents généralisés. Au cours des vingt années de transition, le défi fondamental reste lié à l'impératif d'une profonde réforme de l'Etat, condition sine qua non pour l'avancement du processus de démocratisation. La réforme de la sécurité publique intègre par ainsi une double dimension : rétablir/maintenir l'ordre public et établir les structures qui puissent garantir l'exercice et le respect de l'autorité de l'Etat à l'échelle nationale.

### **III- Les priorités relatives à la réforme**

- 8- En Haïti, la réforme du secteur de la sécurité publique est indissociable de celle de la justice. Ce double processus représente les deux faces d'une même médaille. Les avancées obtenues dans le secteur de la sécurité peuvent ne pas se révéler durables si dans le même temps un véritable processus de la réforme du droit et de la justice n'est pas initié. Cela implique aussi une profonde transformation du système pénitentiaire ou carcéral. Le Gouvernement a la pleine conscience de

l'indissociable articulation des deux défis. Mais l'accent sera mis dans le cadre de ces échanges sur les problèmes relatifs à la sécurité publique.

9- Dans ce secteur, un cadre efficace de coopération et de collaboration entre le Gouvernement et la MINUSTAH a favorisé l'adoption d'un plan global de réforme de la PNH. Ce plan s'étend sur la période 2006-2011 et vise à terme à assurer un service de police efficace, performant et respectueux des valeurs démocratiques.

10- Concernant les actions à court terme, le Gouvernement s'engage à trouver des réponses aux problèmes urgents qui entraînent le dysfonctionnement de la seule institution sécuritaire du pays. Il est question de s'attaquer principalement à :

- la précarité des infrastructures ou installations policières existantes et l'absence d'équipements et de matériels
- la corruption qui gangrène l'institution policière et qui entrave sa collaboration avec la population
- l'absence ou au manque de leadership qui handicape l'efficacité du commandement et favorise l'affaiblissement de l'autorité

A court terme, il s'agit également de mettre la PNH en condition d'assurer les tâches de prévention et de maintien de l'ordre public. Elle doit à ce niveau se confronter à l'épineux problème des gangs armés. Et en ce sens, une bonne base de coordination est établie avec la MINUSTAH. Mais il faut faire en sorte que l'orientation de cette coordination vise à renforcer l'autonomie et la capacité d'action de la PNH. Il importe également dans le court terme de réussir la tâche de désarmement des groupes et individus illégalement armés.

11- A moyen et long terme, il est prévu d'aboutir à une force de sécurité comprenant 14000 policiers bien entraînés et équipés. L'idéal serait d'atteindre, en 2011, 20 000 policiers sur la base du ratio d'un policier pour 500 habitants. Mais la précarité de nos ressources nationales nous éloigne de l'objectif idéal. Les

capacités opérationnelles et administratives de la PNH doivent être renforcées. Cela passe par la restructuration de l'ensemble des services déjà existants et la mise en place de ceux qui sont légalement prévus.

12- Dans le cadre de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité publique, des réponses appropriées doivent être trouvées au problème de la surveillance des frontières terrestres, maritimes et aériennes. Dans l'attente d'un consensus politique national autour de la création d'une autre force publique éventuelle, la PNH doit intégrer dans son plan de développement des dispositions y relatives.

13- Il y a lieu de préciser que la réforme de la sécurité publique ne requiert pas uniquement une claire vision ou orientation et l'adoption d'un plan cohérent. La question des ressources financières indispensables pour la mise en œuvre de la réforme s'avère aussi essentielle. Pour l'ensemble des services de la PNH, le coût global de la réforme est estimé à 700 millions de dollars US pour la période 2006-2011. Ce montant n'inclut pas la couverture des moyens à envisager afin d'assurer la sécurité de nos frontières.

14- Au regard de la situation économique du pays actuellement, il faut bien compter sur l'aide de la communauté internationale. Et là une double difficulté peut être entrevue : le risque que l'orientation et la direction du processus de la réforme puissent être principalement dépendantes de l'influence externe. Le plan de réforme établi avec l'aide de la MINUSTAH prévoit bien que « l'aide internationale doit respecter la primauté de l'Etat haïtien à diriger ses réformes ». Mais la reconnaissance ou l'affirmation de principe d'une telle compétence ne doit pas faire oublier certaines limites bien présentes au niveau de la coopération internationale. L'autre difficulté est la lenteur que peut accuser le processus de réforme. Il est reconnu par tous que la sécurité publique représente le défi qui « conditionne le processus d'institutionnalisation politique et démocratique et la mise en place des programmes de relance économique ». Or, les besoins se font

de plus en plus pressants et les échéances politico-électorales avancent. Les progrès dans le cadre de la réforme doivent se faire en concomitance avec ces défis et même en les devançant.

- 15- Enfin, il reste essentiel de rappeler que même si tous les efforts sont déployés en vue de faire avancer le processus de réforme de la sécurité publique, des résultats durables demeurent liés à l'urgence de mettre en œuvre dans le même temps la réforme du droit et de la justice. Cette erreur a été commise dans le passé. Et aujourd'hui l'aggravation de l'insécurité et le développement des formes nouvelles de violence et de criminalité ne doivent pas conduire à consacrer toutes les énergies dans la répression policière. Nous ne cesserons pas d'insister sur le fait que la justice est l'un des piliers fondamentaux sur lesquels repose la nécessité de rétablir l'ordre public dans le pays.

## SECURITY SECTOR REVIEW ROUNDTABLE 3 November 2006

### Haitian National Police Reform and Development

1

## BACKGROUND

- SCR 1542 Apr 04: to assist the Transitional Government in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police
- SCR 1608 Jun 05: *Requests* the Secretary-General to share with the Council the reform plan for the HNP
- SCR 1658 Feb 06: to finalize the overall reform plan requested in its resolution 1608 (2005) as soon as possible
- March 2006 – DPKO initiative – United Nations and Haitian National Police prepare first draft of the Reform Plan
- August 2006 – Endorsed by Government of Haiti and presented to the Secretary General on 18<sup>th</sup> August 2006
- SCR 1702 Aug 06: *Welcoming* the Government of Haiti's final approval of its HNP reform plan, and calling upon it to implement that plan as soon as possible


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## HNP REFORM PLAN

- Meet the requirements of the Government of Haiti
- Include the details requested by SC, i.e.
  - (1) *anticipated size;*
  - (2) *standards;*
  - (3) *implementation timetable for the execution of the plan;*
  - (4) *resources required for the implementation of the plan.*
- Provide a comprehensive strategic plan for the HNP reform and development

3

## STATUS QUO



4

## STATUS QUO



## STANDARDS

- Recruitment Standards:
  - (1) *Current recruitment standards seem appropriate, if updated with relevant psychological testing;*
  - (2) *Background-checks require improvement:*
    - *Urgent establishment of criminal intelligence database;*
    - *Increase background-check capacity in the IG Office, including the option to create a specific unit in the IG Office.*
- Training Standards:
  - (1) *HNP training curricula and programmes and in line with international standards;*
  - (2) *It is necessary to establish a HNP Board for the endorsement of training material and certification of instructors;*
- Promotion Standards:
  - (1) *Promotion standards consistent with international standards.*

6



## REVIEW OF CURRENT STAFF

### ■ Integrity (Phase one):

- (1) All HNP Staff's background to be checked against the HNP discipline regulation (Reglement de Discipline Generale);
- (2) MINUSTAH to initiate the process by checking DG, IG and IG staff;
- (3) MINUSTAH to certify HNP personnel allowed to join the vetting and background-check teams;
- (4) MINUSTAH to work with HNP as vetting teams;
- (5) Supplementary appeal mechanism to be established by CSPN.

### ■ Competency (Phase two):

- (1) HNP personnel's training records to be examined;
- (2) Competency to be assessed during Field Training Program
- (3) Within the next two years, training inadequacies to be remedied with targeted supplementary training courses.

7

## IMPLEMENTATION

### ■ Sequence:

- (1) Office of the Inspector General:
  - Key to the successful conduct of HNP Staff review;
  - Enhancement of IG capacity to start in September 06;
  - By mid-2007, IG Office to move to new facilities;
  - Initial international support crucial for the background-check of current and additional IG Staff.
- (2) Administration and General Services (phase one):
  - Progressive development of AGS capabilities is key to support to the overall reform process;
  - By September 06, all personnel systems and recruitment;
  - By mid-2007, all personnel functions, including assignment, promotion and appointment;
  - By end of 2006, Directorate of Legal Affairs;
  - By end of 2006, procurement and contracting capacity;
  - Budget and finance to develop in parallel with procurement and personnel systems.

8

## IMPLEMENTATION

### ■ Sequence:

- (3) Facilities:
  - FY 06-07 Building DG Office;  
Building IG Office;  
Facility for new Police Academy;  
Building three police stations;  
Refurbish 20 police stations.
  - FY 07-08 Building Division of Police Operations;  
Building Division of Admin. & General Services;  
Additional Police School (500 cadets);
  - FY 09-10 Building three Regional Investigations Districts;  
Building five police stations;  
Refurbish 30 police stations.

9

## IMPLEMENTATION

### ■ Sequence:

- (4) Regional Departments:
  - By 2011, all Departments, Stations and Sub-Stations to be operational (detailed implementation plan to be prepared for start in FY 06-07);
  - Development process to build upon the "model station" approach;
  - By end 2007, HNP nation-wide radio communications system to be in place;
  - By end 2009, telephone and data system linking Departments, Divisions and HNP Headquarters to be in place;
  - Fleet and equipment servicing and maintenance, in FY 09-10.

10

## IMPLEMENTATION

### ■ Sequence:

- (5) Judicial Police (Criminal Investigations):
  - Its enhancement will depend on the parallel development of judicial and penal systems;
  - Its training-lead time is more time consuming than for general policing;
  - By late 2008, a new building to be ready or JP Headquarters in Port-au-Prince;
  - By 2011, regional facilities for JP to be ready (number and location of new facilities to be determined on the basis of the JP workload and the development of the HNP communications);
  - Bureaus for Criminal Affairs, Trafficking and Narcotics to build upon already existing initiatives (UN and bilateral);
  - By late 2009, Forensics Laboratory (particularly: firearms, toxicology and fingerprint capabilities)

11

## IMPLEMENTATION

### ■ Sequence:

- (6) Police Administration (Operations):
  - By 2008, Close Protection Directorate to be complete. However, gradual capacity building (including training) to be raised during 2006-2007;
  - Suitable facilities for CP Directorate are required;
  - 2006-2008, development of Border Directorate (limited to land, sea, port and air entry points and immigration control functions);
  - Government decision pending on integrated border management and labour division (e.g. Custom Services, Quarantine, Forestry, Border Security and Surveillance);
  - 2006-2007, Civil Protection Directorate (Emergency response to natural disasters);
  - USAID or other international stakeholders to be approached for technical assistance, which was already provided for the establishment of the Civil Protection Office in Port-au-Prince;

12



## IMPLEMENTATION

### Sequence:

- (7) *Administration and General Services (phase two):*
- During 2007, logistic support facility to be constructed;
  - By 2008, maintenance and support capacities to be organised and managed by HNP;
  - HNP inventory system to be extended to full asset management;
  - By end-2009, second portion of communications system to be in place (data link between Regional Departments and Headquarter in Port-au-Prince).

13

## IMPLEMENTATION

### Sequence:

- (8) *Training:*
- Training of 1,400 cadets-year (+ additional number for personnel attrition) is required to achieve the target expansion;
  - Basic training = 10 months (including three-month field training);

On this basis, and in consideration of the requirements for specialised, re-certification and in-service training, the current training capacity is grossly inadequate, and needs to be improved as follows:

- Construction of new Police Academy (100-student capacity);
- Construction of additional school (500-student capacity).


The Police Academy's priority will be the creation of mid-management capacity (Inspector level) to provide competent commanders at the territorial levels.

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## THE INTEGRATED EFFORT

- GoH provides salary and most direct HNP operating costs
- Donors principally provide recovery investment
- MINUSTAH provides personnel inputs for training, institutional development and capacity building
- UN Agencies provide specific technical assistance and facilitate projects


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## INTEGRATION OF EFFORT

- Logical Framework: UNDP – MINUSTAH
  - Multilateral donor coordination
- Coordination with bilateral donors
- Haitian leadership

17



## DEVELOPMENT PILLAR

- Directorates UNPOL Staffing – 374
- UNVs – 22
- P and FS staff – 5
- National staff – 100 including LAs

19

## PRESENT STATUS OF REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT

- Reform and development plan adopted by the Government of Haiti and accepted by the Security Council
- Registration is near complete and poised to start vetting and certification
- Recruitment and Basic training at the required level to meet planned personnel inputs
- The current Basic course has been extended and the next one to start in December 2006 is planned to be 7 months duration
- The FTO programme is in preparation to start December for the current graduating class
- Field Coaching programme has started to fill the competency gap
- Assembling the MINUSTAH resources to support the GoH
- Working with the UN Country team to coordinate efforts
- Mobilizing donor support and integrating current donor activities

20

## **“United Nations’ Role in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform”**

Roundtable co-chaired by  
Slovakia & The Netherlands

### **UK Briefing - Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone**

1

## **The Context:**

- Armed Forces Personnel have initiated every coup since 1967.
- War only formally declared over 4 years ago. Memories and fears still fresh.
- Volatile and unpredictable sub-region. Threat diminished but still not extinguished.
- Aid darling or Aid Orphan?

2

## **The Challenges We Faced**

- Fragmentation and lack of confidence both of, and within the Security Sector.
- No clear leadership or coordination. No joint planning or operational cooperation.
- Marginalisation of non-traditional security ministries.
- Poor resourcing and chronic infrastructure shortages.

3

## **Why Security Sector Reform?**

- ‘What does SSR have to do with poverty reduction?’
- ‘What are the linkages between security and development?’
- How can SSR be linked to broader donor activity?

4

## **Facts & Stats**

- Between 2001 and 2005 the UK has spent a total of £82m on SSR programmes through ACPP.
- £68.5m of this has been spent in Sierra Leone (IMATT & DFID)
- Contributions to DDR process, Community Reintegration, Police Support and non-ACPP funds put UK sectoral spend at approx £125m since 2001.
- £25m Justice Sector Programme & further SSR work to follow.

5

## **Tools of Engagement (1)**

- Security Sector Governance
- Security Sector & Defence Reviews
- Organisational Development
- Force Structures
- Financial Management, Procurement & Logistics
- Training and Equipment Programmes
- Infrastructure Assistance

6

## Tools of Engagement (2)

- IMATT engaged at all levels within the RSLAF
- DFID-funded Advisers within the Ministry of Defence, Sierra Leone Police and the Office of National Security
- UNAMSIL, UNPOL significant presence
- Network of support initiating engagement from other bilaterals (US, India, Netherlands, Switzerland, China)
- Partnership and participation not imposition.

7

## Achievements (1)

- Capability developed to allow successful drawdown of UNAMSIL without incident.
- Office of National Security developed to bring central coordination to security sector.
- Civil control of Armed Forces achieved & civil/military integration enhanced within MoD.
- Extensive Police training undertaken. Capability support enables police deployment throughout N, S & E regions.

8

## Achievements (2)

- Completion of an SSR review by local staff. Inclusion of Security within PRSP for the 1st time.
- Security Sector Review recommendations being implemented locally with external funding.
- Significant improvement of SLP/RSLAF relations. Public perception of both improving.
- Justice Sector strategy in final draft, with implementation funding being secured.

9

## Learning the Lessons (SSR)

- Local ownership critical.
- Use of advisory not executive staff beneficial in the long-term, but takes time. This needs to be factored into planning for UN missions.
- Cooperation within, and between donors is vital.
- Affordability/Sustainability in face of conflicting global and local priorities.

10

## Learning the Lessons

- Greater balance between Security & Development required.
- Socio-Economic issues need to be factored into Peacekeeping/Peacebuilding approaches.
- SSR provides opportunity to tackle symptoms, but root causes need attention also.
- Greater sequencing within and between multilaterals and bilaterals required.

11

## Questions/Comments?

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